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How a Permanent Crisis Fund can Promote European Solidarity
With Ireland set to receive an 85 billion Euro loan
from the European Union (EU), and Portugal almost
certain to follow, the ongoing economic crisis con-
tinues to challenge several important aspects of
European integration and stability – especially the
Euro. Stemming from this active role of the EU in
granting emergency loans, the EU has become an
important actor in national-level fiscal and mone-
tary decision-making. Furthermore, emerging from
potential sovereign debt crises within the Eurozone,
the European Council agreed to set up a permanent
crisis fund. These developments elucidate the rapid
evolution of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)
and the European Exchange Rate Mechanism II
(ERM II), further validating the
increasing importance of the
EU in national-level fiscal poli-
cy both within and outside the
Eurozone. However, whether or
not a member state engulfed in
crisis is in the Eurozone has
significant impacts on the relationship between aus-
terity and emergency funding. This is evident by a
comparison of the cases of Hungary, Latvia and
Greece. The permanent crisis fund offers an oppor-
tunity to correct these divergent responses and pro-
vide a uniform framework for crisis in the future.
Entering and Maintaining the Euro
The current purpose of the ERM II is to provide an
intermediate step in member-states’ transition to the
euro. The ERM II is part of the Maastricht Treaty’s
convergence criteria, which mirror the SGP criteria.
Every member state, excepting the United Kingdom,
Denmark and in practice Sweden, are obliged to
enter the Euro through the ERM II mechanism. This
requires adhering to the SGP criteria both before
and after adoption of the Euro. If a Eurozone mem-
ber failed to uphold the fiscal criteria for three con-
secutive years, they were to be subjected to the
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) which consists of
a series of Council recommendations followed by
increasingly severe sanctions with eventual fines.
However, even before the late-2000s global financial
crisis, the SGP criteria were routinely ignored in
actual practice and the EDP was never effectively
implemented. By the time data emerged for the 2009
fiscal year, it became clear that the majority of
Eurozone member states were in violation of the
SGP criteria while non-Euro member states, aside
for Slovakia, appeared to be diverging from the cri-
teria as well. Beginning with debt and currency cri-
ses in Hungary, Latvia and Romania, followed by
default threats from Eurozone
members Greece, Spain, Portu-
gal and Ireland, the SGP has
been effectively ignored while
the ERM II has been sidelined
on a case-by-case basis. This
comes in spite of a continuing
effort by powerful member states, Germany in parti-
cular, to enforce the SGP criteria through EU-level
approaches. Unfortunately, leverage to enforce the
criteria is gained only in the most desperate member
states who have applied for emergency loans.
However, even within those member states, the EU
has not uniformly pressured governments, as the
cases of Hungary, Latvia and Greece illustrate.
Therefore, a brief exploration of the differences be-
tween these cases will demonstrate the need to
adopt a more uniform approach.
Crisis in Hungary, Latvia and Greece
Although every country in Europe faced struggles
deriving from the financial crisis, some were hit hard-
er than others. The financial crisis brought consider-
able turmoil in Hungary, Latvia and Greece – each for
different reasons. However, each required an emer-
gency loan to prevent defaulting on its commitments,
"Even before the late-2000s global
financial crisis, the SGP criteria were
routinely ignored in actual practice
and the EDP was never effectively
implemented."
The development of a permanent Euro crisis fund will have lasting impacts on the relationships between member
states of the European Union. It is therefore essential that the character of this institution reflects not only the
relations between member states at the current juncture, but also strengthens member state cooperation in the
future.
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and each of these loans came with conditions.
Because the EU has become an important actor in
determining these conditions, it is important to
understand how a lack of uniform response, largely
due to each country's differing relationship with the
Euro, delegitimizes the EU in member-states engulfed
in crisis.
Hungary reached over 9% fiscal deficit levels in 2006.
During the liquidity crisis in late-2008, the Hungarian
government was forced to secure a joint EU and IMF
loan because it couldn't obtain sufficient funds from
its paralyzed bond market. This
loan was necessary despite the
prior institution of an austerity
program which brought its defi-
cit to 3.8% by 2008. Insiders
have documented the particu-
larly vociferous role of the EU in
promoting even further austeri-
ty and opposing the rapid and
unilateral entry of Hungary into
the Eurozone – a potential mea-
sure to resolve the crisis. The EU opposition to this
possible solution, coupled with the deep unpopularity
of EU-pressured austerity measures, contributed to
the April 2010 election of Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz Party,
in a populist-nationalist coalition. Riding a wave of
anti-EU and anti-banking public sentiment, Orbán
promptly refused the remaining funds of the emer-
gency loan package, refused further austerity mea-
sures demanded by the EU and IMF, and instead
imposed a controversial bank tax to generate the addi-
tional revenue for the government. It is too early to
determine the result of these measures, but it is cer-
tain that Hungary has directly challenged a coordina-
ted European response to crisis and implicitly sug-
gested an unwillingness to enter either the ERM II or
the SGP – both uncomfortable precedents for the EU.
In contrast, Latvia had entered the ERM II in 2005
when it was known as the 'Baltic Tiger.' By late 2008,
Latvia applied for emergency loans from the IMF
and EU due to liquidity problems. The EU again
pressured Latvia to adopt painful austerity measures
and refused unilateral Euroization. However, partly
due to the government’s obstinate refusal to devalue
the lat from the peg set by the ERM II in 2005, despite
extending the target entry to the Euro from 2012 to
2014, the government succumbed to EU pressure for
austerity. As a result of this austerity in the face of
crisis, Latvia suffered both the highest unemploy-
ment and highest GDP decline in Europe.
Greece, already a member of the Eurozone, began to
show signs of an even larger debt crisis after nation-
al elections in October of 2009. The new government
of George Papendreou disclosed that the previous
government had manipulated fiscal figures and the
Greek deficit was actually over 12% of GDP. This
resulted in a credit downgrade for Greek sovereign
bonds, sending shockwaves through the bond mar-
ket and lead to a sharp rise in the rate for Greek
bonds as well as fears of similar problems with
Spain, Portugal and Ireland. This prompted an emer-
gency meeting by the EU, and largely through the
leadership and financial bak-
king of Germany, the creation
of the European Financial
Stabilization Facility (EFSF), an
emergency fund designed to
restore confidence in sovereign
debt through conditional loans
to any member state in need –
the first of which was Greece.
After receiving these emergen-
cy loans, although praised by
lender countries for its institution of painful austeri-
ty measures in the face of often violent public pro-
test, many lenders believe that the Greek govern-
ment has not done enough.
In each case, the European Union adopted the poli-
cies most favored by lender states or financial actors
and deeply unpopular with the populations of those
countries engulfed by crisis. However, it appears
that only a commitment to the ERM II was sufficient
to actually follow the EU advice. The strength of the
EU's position therefore results from a given member
state's relation to the Euro. If all member states are
to be considered equals, then the establishment of a
permanent crisis mechanism must be uniformly
applied in the future.
Setting up a Permanent Crisis Fund in Response
By late October 2010, stemming from a series of
initiatives spearheaded by German Chancellor
Angela Merkel, the EU agreed in principle to estab-
lish a permanent crisis fund to protect the Euro,
much like the EFSF’s temporary fund. This fund
would be bankrolled by every member state, includ-
ing those outside the Eurozone, and wielded as an
instrument to ensure financial stability, as well as
fiscal austerity, in Eurozone members engulfed in
crisis. At the same time, an aspect of the plan called
for private actors, who were often responsible for
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"Riding a wave of anti-EU and anti-
banking public sentiment, Orbán
promptly refused the remaining funds
of the emergency loan package, refu-
sed further austerity measures dem-
anded by the EU and IMF, and inste-
ad imposed a controversial bank tax
to generate the additional revenue for
the government."
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bond market instability through speculation, to con-
tribute to the fund.
Two key points of this permanent mechanism, and
which have not yet been determined, are how private
actors will help finance the fund and what its rela-
tionship will be with those member states that have
not adopted the Euro. Few consider the measure
negotiable outside the dominant preferences of
Germany, and therefore the policy visions of the cur-
rent German government are of key importance.
First, it appears the current German position is for all
member-states to contribute to the fund, but only
Eurozone members will be covered by it. Secondly, in
November of 2010, German Finance Minister
Wolfgang Schäuble disclosed in an interview with
Der Spiegel regarding how private actors will finance
the fund: “I imagine a two-stage
process. If a country is having
financial difficulties, the EU will
launch an austerity and restruc-
turing program, as it did in the
case of Greece. In a first step, the
maturities of those bonds that
come due in this critical phase could be extended. If
that doesn't help, private investors will have to accept
a markdown on their claims, in a second step. In
return, they'll receive guarantees on the rest.”
Recommendations
1. There is a relatively simple solution to how private
actors will finance a fund which is explicitly de-
signed to contain, through public intervention, their
speculative excesses. The suggestions of Wolfgang
Schäuble are both insufficient and excessively com-
plex in practice. Therefore, the fund should be fi-
nanced through a miniscule, but European-wide,
exchange fee on bond transactions. Instead of cre-
ating an instrument controlled by the dominant
member states to force conditional austerity on the
poorer nations, it will create a powerful multi-lateral
institution that will serve the purposes of every EU
member state while protecting the Euro.
2. This exchange fee should be levied at every point
of bond purchase or exchange of bond-based secu-
rities. Therefore, if the fee has any effect at all on the
bond market, which is unlikely if applied universal-
ly, it will only discourage excessive short-term spec-
ulation because rapid turnover will become increa-
singly less profitable due to accumulated fees on
exchanges. Considering the volume of bond-market
transactions, a fee of considerably less than 0.1%
should easily provide sufficient resources for the EU
crisis fund without deterring legitimate long-term
investors from buying government bonds.
3. The fee should be instituted at the national-level
for all member states, but directly supplying the EU-
level supranational fund. Therefore, because of the
fee’s universal application, it will not violate any EU
rules on competitiveness and economic integration
between member states. Moreover, a fee levied on
financial actors in the bond market will be both
cheaper and more palatable for the donor states’
citizenry than directly bankrolling the fund by tax-
payers. The current environment of public sentiment
is sharply critical of private actors still profiting from
publicly bailed out financial markets, especially con-
sidering the European-wide
calls for austerity measures –
measures which are never
popular.
4. Short-term debt financing is a
significant reason for financial
volatility and crisis. The EU should work towards
more structured long-term government finances.
However, this is better accomplished not through
vague regulations applied unsystematically at the
national level, but a single institutional mechanism
which discourages short-term financing.
5. Allow all member states to have access to the per-
manent crisis fund. This will do away with the sepa-
rate institutional mechanism of the Balance of
Payments Facility which continuously demonstrates,
like with the differing policies adopted for Hungary
and Latvia, a divergent policy for countries with
similar problems. This divergence is both politically
damaging to the European project and a disincentive
to join the ERM II. Without a uniform set of proce-
dures for all member states engulfed in crisis, capri-
cious negotiations and routine violations of existing
agreements with the EU becomes the norm.
Moreover, the very likelihood of a Eurozone emer-
gency fund obtaining consensual approval, when
bankrolled by all members of the European Union, is
quite dismal. With Sweden and the United Kingdom
having de facto opt-outs from the Euro, it is unlikely
that these primarily EU donor countries would sup-
port such a proposal as its details become clearer.
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ble outside the dominant preferen-
ces of Germany, and therefore the
policy visions of the current German
government are of key importance."
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